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Abstract 
  
The principles of self-determination and territorial integrity are some of the most 
important norms in modern international law, enshrined in the UN Charter and numerous 
subsequent sources of law. However, in practice, the two come in conflict when a minority 
group’s desire for complete self-determination in the form of secession confronts the territorial 
inviolability of the state within which that group resides.  
This paper seeks to answer how such a situation is managed by the international 
community through examining the status of a right to secession in international law. It is a 
concept surrounded by much controversy, however, in the contemporary international arena, 
where secessionist movements play an important role in conflicts, the right to secession cannot go 
unaddressed. The objective of this paper is to analyse the approach taken in international law to 
the right to secession and dissect which elements of this approach ought to be improved.  
Summary 
  
 This paper aims to examine the status of the right to secession in international law, which 
in itself is a result of the clash between the established principles of self-determination and 
territorial integrity. The research conducted in this paper is of an interdisciplinary nature and 
employs the inductive method to build an analysis of the right to secession in international law.  
 The first part of the paper analyses the two principles and the conflict between them 
which forms the backdrop of the conversation around the right to secession. The first element to 
be discussed is the dichotomy between internal self-determination (self-government) and external 
self-determination (secession) as it plays an important part of the different understandings of the 
principle in law. Further, the role of self-determination is analysed in the UN Charter and the 
International Human Rights Covenants, to ascertain how these sources of international law 
envisioned self-determination and how, if at all, the right to secession is treated in them. The 
principle of territorial integrity is also examined in the UN Charter, as well as the Friendly 
Relations Declaration. This part of the paper introduces the interstate character of the principle of 
territorial integrity, which establishes the approach of international law to secessionist 
movements, and by extension, secession itself – essentially, international law neither prohibits, 
nor permits, instead choosing to simply stay mute on the matter and frame it as a domestic issue, 
rather than an international one. 
 The second part, having examined the wilful silence of sources of law, looks to normative 
theory. It touches upon the recent development of the discussion around a theory of secession, 
illustrating how “fresh” the concept of a right to secession is – only recently have scholars begun 
to theorize on it. The chapter outlines two main groups of theories of secession and seeks to find 
how elements of these theories could improve the current system of international law regarding 
secession. 
 The third part looks at the approach taken by courts. It analyses two cases, Quebec and 
Kosovo. Each case illustrates a different situation and a different treatment of secession. Quebec 
is an instance where the “hands off” approach of international law worked – the parties involved 
dealt with secession domestically and without any violence. Kosovo, on the other hand, is a case 
where the framing of secession as a purely internal issue caused the international community to 
stand by and look on while severe injustice was committed in Kosovo as a result of a secessionist 
tensions. It is a case where an active involvement of the international community would have 
benefited the inhabitants of both Kosovo and Serbia. Furthermore, the approach taken by ICJ to 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence illustrates an unwillingness to become involved with the 
matter of secession.  
 Therefore, even though secession is an issue with increasing importance on the world 
stage, international law refuses to admit it is so and remains entrenched in the idea that secession 
does not pertain to the international level. This is problematic for a number of reasons, the most 
pressing being that it facilitates violence both by and against secessionist movements.   
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Introduction 
 In Monty Python’s classic 1979 film Life of Brian, the titular character joins a nationalist 
group, the People’s Front of Judea, who wish to gain independence from the Roman occupants. 
In one particular scene the members of the group have the following conversation: 
REG:  The only people we hate more than the Romans are the Judean People's Front. 
P.F.J.: Splitters. Splitters... 
FRANCIS: And the Judean Popular People's Front. 
P.F.J.: Yeah. Oh, yeah. Splitters. Splitters... 
LORETTA: And the People's Front of Judea. 
REG: What? 
LORETTA: The People's Front of Judea. Splitters. 
REG: We're the People's Front of Judea!
1
 
 The scene depicts in a whimsical manner a situation where numerous nationalist groups 
exist in one state. These groups are characterized by volatile behaviour, a desire for independence 
and a deep hatred not only for the perceived oppressor state, but also for one another. Though 
taken from a comedy, this precisely portrays why the right to external self-determination or, in 
other words, secession, is a deeply unacceptable concept for most states – with the existence of 
such a right, these groups would be able to claim their own state, and then for various reasons, 
secede further into several smaller states, essentially launching into endless fragmentation. The 
instability and conflict such a situation would undoubtedly cause is one of the arguments why 
external self-determination is treated with great caution by the international community and in 
international law. 
 This caution, however, has not been particularly helpful in genuinely avoiding conflicts 
related to self-determination. Throughout the 19
th
 and the 20
th
 centuries, the international 
community managed to reduce the number of international conflicts, a success which has been 
attributed to the establishment of such international law rules as the principle of territorial 
integrity.
2
 However, non-international conflicts have become increasingly more common - during 
the Cold War, some 150 conflicts took place, most of which were civil wars.
3
 Not all of these 
were concerned with self-determination of a specific ethnic or national group, but around half of 
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the active non-international conflicts at the end of the 20th century were connected to this 
particular issue.
4
 Similarly, in the 21
st
 century, the world has also seen several high profile 
instances of internal conflicts dealing with self-determination, such as Crimea, South Ossetia and, 
to an extent, Catalonia, as well as peaceful attempts to attain external self-determination, such as 
Scotland. Therefore, self-determination in the form of secession plays an important role in 
contemporary conflicts. Its relevance certainly has not waned in the 21
st
 century, and it is 
precisely this enduring relevance that makes it difficult for international law to ignore the subject 
of secession. Therein lies the dilemma - on the one hand, self-determination could be likened to a 
Pandora’s box that possesses the potential to wreak havoc on the international arena, if opened. 
On the other hand, there is increased importance attached to self-determination and the wish for 
external self-determination is a crucial element in many prominent conflicts. By continuing the 
path of caution and not addressing the issue, the international law system risks losing relevance in 
the contemporary world.  
This paper focuses on the status of secession in international law. Secession is the most 
extreme manifestation of the principle of self-determination and, as such, it lies at the very core 
of the conflict between two contrasting norms of international law – the principles of self-
determination and territorial integrity. The concept of secession is inseparable from the conflict 
between these two principles; therefore, this paper seeks to answer the following research 
question:  
Within the context of the conflict between the principles of self-determination and territorial 
integrity, how does international law approach the right to external self-determination? 
 In order to provide a comprehensive answer to the question, this research will consist of 
three parts, each consisting of two chapters. The first part of the paper shall look at each of the 
two principles separately, providing firstly a historical development of each principle, as it is 
crucial to be familiar with the different reiterations of both principles throughout history in order 
to fully understand their current nature. Secondly, the paper will examine the two principles as set 
out in sources of international law. This analysis will delve into the interpretation of each 
principle with regards to its scope and meaning, and relationship to each other, as well as it will 
seek to identify specific elements of each principle, where the law is ambivalent and clarifications 
are necessary.  
                                               
4
 Ibidem. 
The second chapter will elaborate on normative theories on secession to reflect the 
contemporary scholarly discussion on the subject. In contrast to international law, which adapts 
to a rapidly changing world rather slowly, normative theories can be quicker to develop a variety 
of solutions on how a particular concept should be approached, in this case, secession. These 
chapters will build on the analysis conducted in the first part regarding the unclarities in the law 
and will elaborate on the answers offered by political theorists. 
The third part will consist of two case studies – the secession attempts of Quebec and 
Kosovo. There will be a short overview provided for each case, followed by an analysis of two 
different approaches taken by courts when faced with the subject of secession. Regarding the 
Quebec case study, the author of this paper will analyse the Reference Re Secession of Quebec 
judgement, to show the more liberal approach to secession that is conducted peacefully, in 
accordance with domestic law. In the Kosovo case study, the subject of analysis will be the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence. 
This, in contrast, will show a different approach, illustrating a situation where secession is sought 
after due to injustices committed by the state against a peoples. Furthermore, it will also shed 
light on the hesitance of international law to address the issue of secession properly. 
The author of this paper is not attempting to make the case in favour of a right to 
secession – only to point out the shortcomings in the approach the international community has 
adopted regarding this issue. A right to secession need not necessarily exist, however, in its 
current state, it seems to lie in the abyss of “neither prohibited, nor allowed”.  The author of this 
paper argues that by failing to provide guidelines on the relationship between the principles self-
determination and territorial integrity and choosing time and time again to frame secession as a 
purely domestic issue, international law has thus far failed to adapt to the contemporary state of 
world affairs where secession plays an important role.  
  
1. The principles of self-determination and territorial integrity 
1.1. The principle of self-determination 
This chapter will focus on the principle of self-determination from a legal perspective. 
The first section will provide an overview of the historical development of the concept of self-
determination. The second section will examine how the major instruments adopted under the 
UN system have interpreted self-determination. The legal sources chosen for the purposes of this 
paper are the UN Charter and the International Human Rights Covenants – the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). These are of particular importance regarding self-
determination as the Charter and the twin covenants were the first instances where self-
determination was codified and introduced as a universal human right.  
 A few words should be said on the separation of self-determination into internal and 
external self-determination. This division is largely the foundation on which most scholarship on 
self-determination is built and it plays a large part in the way international law interprets the 
principle.
5
 In accordance with internal self-determination, peoples of an independent state should 
be able to elect their own government, and be governed by it.
6
 Internal self-determination deals 
with the entitlements of the peoples within a state. Cassese provided a more concise definition, 
saying that the right to internal self-determination is “the right to authentic self-government”7, 
which gives people the ability to determine their political or economic regime. Internal self-
determination is prominent in international law, as will be shown in the following analysis since 
it allows states to avoid any possibility of secession but is still regarded as being in line with the 
ideals of liberal democracy.  
 Opposite to internal self-determination is the other aspect, external self-determination. 
This, as the name suggests, deals not with the internal affairs of a state, but rather the 
international status of a peoples.
8
  Essentially, it is the choice of peoples to determine their 
political status on the international arena by forming their own sovereign state or joining in union 
with another state. During the decolonization process, external self-determination was the 
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prevalent interpretation of the right to self-determination, as it allowed previously colonised 
peoples to gain independence – for this reason, countries in Africa and Asia pushed for this 
understanding of self-determination to be recognized.
9
 However, once the decolonization era 
drew to a close, it was clear that the notion of external self-determination could not apply 
universally.
10
 External self-determination in practice equates with an act of secession, therefore, 
within the non-colonial context, it is seen as an extreme form of self-determination.  
 The dichotomy between the two aspects of self-determination could be interpreted also as 
the difference between self-government and secession. It must be noted, however, that the 
concept of self-determination is a highly complex one and this division introduces a certain 
degree of simplification.
11
 However, for the purposes of this paper, the division between internal 
and external self-determination will be accepted.  
1.1.1 Historical development of self-determination 
 It is by no means easy to pinpoint when the ideas of self-determination first appeared.
12
 
The  roots of the contemporary understanding of self-determination can be found in the 
Westphalian settlement of 1648, which set up the stage for the modern international system.
13
 
Further progress took place during the 18th century with the Enlightenment movement, which 
gave rise to the notion that if the people are not content with the existing governing system, they 
should be able to change it or organize their own.
14
 During the latter part of the 18th century, the 
Western world experienced the American Revolution of 1776 and the French Revolution of 1789 
– both revolutions fundamentally changed the political landscape and contributed to the 
development of self-determination. These two events could be said to be the first expressions of 
the idea of self-determination.
15
  
The turning point for self-determination as a legal doctrine came in the 20th century, in 
the aftermath of World War I. WWI unleashed unprecedented change in all areas of Western 
society. During the early 20th century, Vladimir Lenin and Woodrow Wilson, the political 
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leaders of the then-emerging great powers, the Soviet Union and the US, sought to conceptualize 
self-determination and to provide a definition for it.
16
 Though the two statesmen were certainly 
on opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, both their perceptions of self-determination proved 
influential over the following decades. Lenin’s view was, naturally, deeply intertwined with 
socialist ideology. His most important contribution to the development to the concept of self-
determination postulated that self-determination should be used to end the oppression of 
colonised nations. This interpretation manifested itself in the harsh anti-colonial stance of the 
Soviet Union, and had a significant impact on international law during the second half of the 20th 
century, during which colonialism, previously considered normal and usual, came to be viewed 
as shameful and illegal.
17
  
In comparison, the Wilsonian understanding of self-determination was unconstrained by 
the ideological framework of socialism and was more deeply rooted in the ideas of Western 
democracy. To an extent, Woodrow Wilson’s view of self-determination was that the will of the 
people prevails over that of the government, and in that way, existed as a direct extension of the 
ideas which arose during the French and American revolutions.
18
 Though Wilson stopped short 
of providing a clear definition for the principle, he was adamant that self-determination would be 
crucial in restructuring central Europe following WWI.
19
  
In addition to Wilson’s attempts to conceptualize the principle of self-determination, he 
also was determined to institutionalize it. He believed that one of the major functions of the 
League of Nations should be ensuring the implementation of self-determination. Article 3 of the 
draft Wilson offered for the Covenant of the League of Nations referred to the principle, but 
during the Paris Peace Conference the draft was significantly changed and Wilson’s original text 
regarding self-determination was not included in the Covenant, allegedly due to the wishes of the 
representatives of the British Empire.
20
 The concept of self-determination was certainly an 
unwelcome apparition for many, including Wilson’s own Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, who 
referred to self-determination as a “phrase loaded with dynamite”. He felt that a principle of self-
determination was bound to bring further conflict, rather than peace, in that it would “[...] raise 
                                               
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Anderson supra note 12, pp. 1198-1199. 
18
 Ibid, p. 1199-1200. 
19
 Russell A. Miller, "Self-Determination in International Law and the Demise of Democracy," Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 41, no. 3 (2003), p. 619. Last accessed on April 5, 2020. Available on: HeinOnline. 
20
 Nawaz supra note 15, p. 85. 
hopes which can never be realized”.21 After WWII self-determination was enshrined into the UN 
Charter of 1945 and appeared in many subsequent international law sources. Nevertheless, the 
sentiment voiced by Robert Lansing persists – giving more legal weight to the principle of self-
determination has done little to make it more certain.  
By following the development of the self-determination principle throughout history, one 
can come to several conclusions about its nature. Firstly, the principle of self-determination is 
incompatible with an elitist system of government, be it monarchic or authoritarian. Secondly, as 
is evident in the fact that the concept of self-determination was essentially developed by groups 
seeking political change, it inherently challenges the political status quo. Thirdly, despite being 
recognized as a right in the contemporary era, self-determination is still shrouded in mystery 
regarding its content, scope and nature. Lansing’s view, expressed in the 1920s, is still relevant 
today – many still see the principle of self-determination as though it were a Pandora’s box or a 
“philosophical genie which has escaped its bottle”.22  
1.1.2. Self-determination in international law 
UN Charter 
 The United Nations Charter is notable as the first legal instrument which included the 
phrase “self-determination of all peoples”, thus essentially establishing self-determination as an 
internationally recognized legal principle. Self-determination appears in the very first article of 
the Charter – Article 1(2) states that one of the purposes of the UN is to “to develop friendly 
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples”,23 however it does not provide a further explanation as to what that might mean 
exactly. The principle is also mentioned in Chapter IX, Article 55, which again refers to the “self-
determination of peoples” yet fails to expand on the meaning of the term. A particularly 
controversial question has been the meaning of the word “peoples” – the is no explanation as to 
who are the “peoples” that can claim self-determination.24 Though the word is often understood 
to mean groups of people linked by certain national similarities – a common language, common 
traditions or a common ethnic identity, – there is great uncertainty surrounding this term. 
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Articles 73 and 76 provide a different, albeit equally uncertain, context for the word 
“peoples”. However, at the same time, the two articles manage to illuminate slightly more as to 
what the principle of self-determination expresses. Article 73(b), which deals with Non-Self-
Governing Territories (NSGTs), declares that member states of the UN that have assumed 
responsibilities over non-self-governing territories, must “develop self-government, to take due 
account of the political aspirations of the peoples”. Several conclusions can be drawn from this 
statement. Firstly, as is evident here, the term “peoples” is used to refer explicitly to the 
population of these NSGTs. Article 73 defines NSGTs as “territories whose peoples have not yet 
attained a full measure of self-government”, but there is no clarification provided as to what 
constitutes “full measure of self-government”, which complicates the identification of the 
relevant “peoples”.25 Secondly, Article 73(b) does not mention “self-determination” as such, but 
substitutes it with the term “self-government”. The following text of Article 73(b) elucidates 
what “self-government” entails: “[..] to take due account of the political aspirations of the 
peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, 
according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages 
of advancement”. Thus, this sheds light on what “self-determination” is in the context of the UN 
Charter – a principle that deals with colonized territories and their self-government.26 In Chapter 
XII, which concerns the international trusteeship system, Article 76(b) states that one of the 
purposes of the system is “to promote the [...] progressive development towards self-government 
or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its 
peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the 
terms of each trusteeship agreement”. As in Article 73, self-determination is interpreted as self-
government for colonised peoples.
27
 The term “peoples” here refers to the populations of the 
Trust Territories. Furthermore, in Article 73 and Article 76, self-government is something states 
“develop” and “promote” respectively. This wording implies a level of ambiguity – it certainly 
does not indicate that there exists a right to self-determination in the UN Charter.
28
  
During the drafting process, particularly interesting in the context of this paper, was the 
question of secession, which was raised by the delegates from Belgium, France, Canada, Chile 
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and others.
29
 So as to protect their own territorial integrity, many states were insistent on ensuring 
that the inclusion of self-determination in the Charter does not in any way imply the possibility of 
a right to secession. At the San Francisco Conference, the delegate from Colombia expressed the 
view that self-determination as “the right of a country to provide its own government” was an 
acceptable concept, but that “[...] if it were to be interpreted, on the other hand, as connoting a 
withdrawal, the right of withdrawal or secession, then we should regard that as tantamount to 
international anarchy”, and this fell in line with the opinion of many states.30 To resolve the 
controversy around this issue, the drafting committee made it clear that “the principle conformed 
to the purposes of the Charter only insofar as it implied the right of self-government of peoples 
and not the right of unilateral secession”.31 This further explains the role of self-determination in 
the UN Charter – by explicitly denying a right to secession, the intention was to strip the 
principle of self-determination of its radical nature, in that way ensuring that its expression in 
praxis is orderly and does not clash with the territorial integrity of already existing states.  
Through analysing the principle of self-determination, one arrives at the following 
conclusion – the Charter envisions self-determination not as a right, but rather a principle which 
applies to “all peoples”, a term that does not possess a wholly certain meaning. Though Articles 1 
and 55 of the Charter mention self-determination as one of the basic principles for the 
development of friendly relations between all states, Articles 73 and 76 indicate that, within the 
context of the Charter, self-determination pertains more to the self-government of colonized 
territories. In addition to that, the Charter clearly interprets self-determination as a principle that 
enables the development of self-government amongst non-self-governing peoples, rather than a 
principle which allows inhabitants of an already existing state to secede and form their own.  
 
International Human Rights Covenants 
The following section will examine the role of self-determination in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), otherwise known as the Human Rights Covenants. The 
UN General Assembly adopted the two legal instruments in 1966, and the covenants came into 
                                               
29
 Tofig F. Musayev, Rovshan Sadigbayli, "The Purposes and Principles of the un Charter Origins, Subsequent 
Developments in Law and Practice and (Mis)interpretation in the Context of Unilateral Secession Claims in the 
OSCE Area", Security and Human Rights 28 (2017), p. 193, last accessed on: April 6, 2020. Available on: 
https://brill.com/view/journals/shrs/28/1-4/article-p180_180.xml?language=en#d97660e574  
30
 Anderson, supra note 12, p. 1207. 
31
 Musayev, Sadigbayli, supra note 29, p. 194. 
force in 1976. At the time, these were some of the most extensive treaties regarding human rights 
that the international community had created. To this day, the twin covenants are regarded as the 
very foundation of basic human rights.
32
  
Regarding self-determination, the covenants are of importance. Though the right to self-
determination had been enshrined in a UN document before, namely the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, that was done against the backdrop 
of the decolonisation process.
33
 The human rights covenants were the first instance where the 
right to self-determination was removed from the context of colonisation and intended to be 
applied universally. The beginning of Article 1(1), identical to both covenants, is as follows: “All 
peoples have the right of self-determination.”34 35 It explains what this right entails by stating: 
“By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development”.36 The wording and placement given to self-
determination are both notable – the words “all peoples” imply that the right to self-determination 
is universal, while the placement, by which self-determination is stated before all other rights, 
suggests that this is, in a sense, the first of human rights, without which the enjoyment of all other 
rights is compromised.
37
 Articles 1(2) and, particularly, 1(3) elaborate on the universal nature of 
the right to self-determination. Article 1(3) provides that “the States Parties to the present 
Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing 
and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination”. The word 
“including” here is paramount, as it shows that the application of the right is not limited to 
inhabitants of colonised territories. It goes beyond colonial issues and is equally as relevant in a 
non-colonial setting.  
However, similarly as with the UN Charter, the most significant controversy regarding the 
human rights covenants has been around the term “all peoples”. The drafting history of Article 1 
provides additional information as to what was intended by the UN Human Rights Committee 
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and the General Assembly’s Third Committee. The article was drafted by the two committees 
during the time period from 1950 to 1955, when the process of decolonization was in full 
swing.
38
 Arab and Asian countries, as well as the Soviet Union, due to its anti-colonial stance, 
were interested in pushing for the right to self-determination.
39
 The consensus at the time was 
that the right would not be exclusive to colonised peoples, but would apply to all peoples; 
however, the ambiguity of that term – “peoples” – did not evade discussion. Suggestions were 
made as to how the term could be best defined, some of the examples including “large compact 
national groups” or “racial units inhabiting well-defined territories”. In the end, it was settled that 
the term was to be understood “in its most general sense and that no definition was necessary”.40 
Furthermore, the adoption of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR established a complaint 
mechanism, where the Human Rights Committee could hear communications from individuals 
who believed their rights, as set out in the ICCPR, were being infringed upon. On several 
occasions, the Human Rights Committee has been asked to consider the interpretation of Article 
1, on whether particular groups constituted as a “people”, but the Committee has thus far avoided 
having to explicitly decide on the issue.
41
 A General Comment
42
 exists on Article 1, but in it, the 
Committee refrains from providing a more certain interpretation of what is to be understood as 
“peoples”. Therefore, though the covenants transform the principle set out in the UN Charter into 
a right, they provide little clarity on that right – it has a universal nature, but there are no criteria 
for which groups of individuals constitute a “peoples”. 
 Another thing to note is how the covenants deal with the matter of secession. Article 1(1) 
states that the right to self-determination enables all peoples to determine their own “political 
status”, amongst other elements. The term “political status” possesses a broad interpretation and 
can be understood to mean a variety of statuses – from a form of government to independence. 
Moreover, during the drafting process, some of the proposed definitions of the right to self-
determination included interpretations such as the right to “establish an independent state” or 
“secede from or unite with another people”.43 Therefore, one could be led to think that there is 
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some foundation in Article 1(1) for a right to secession. However, that is not the case – in the 
drafting of the covenants, most participating states made it clear that the right to self-
determination did not in any way entail the right to secession, but rather that it referred to self-
government, or internal self-determination, similarly as in the UN Charter.
44
 Furthermore, upon 
ratification of the covenants, several states made declarations announcing that Article 1 is not to 
be interpreted as referring to peoples within an existing sovereign state. India, for example, said 
that the right to self-determination is only applicable to peoples “under foreign domination” and 
not to “sovereign independent States or to a section of a people or nation”.45 Indonesia stated that 
the right to self-determination cannot be understood as endorsing any acts that would “dismember 
[...] the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states”.46  
The human rights covenants are an important source and a turning point for the right to 
self-determination – with the two covenants that right became applicable universally. However, 
the same uncertainties which plagued self-determination in the UN Charter are also evident in 
these instruments – the lack of criteria regarding which groups can claim the right to self-
determination and a high degree of ambiguity over what that right entails. Similarly, as in the UN 
Charter, the covenants seem to refer to a right to internal self-determination (self-government) 
rather than a right to external self-determination (secession).  
1.2. The principle of territorial integrity 
1.2.1. Historical development of territorial integrity 
 Territorial integrity, in its very essence, illustrates the wish for stability and continuance. 
The beginnings of the principle are generally understood to be found with the Westphalian 
settlement of 1648. Beforehand, during the late medieval ages and the early modern period, 
territory was viewed in a drastically different manner than it is now – then, territory ensured the 
security and wealth of a state, and, therefore, protecting land, as well as gaining new land was the 
main goal of most rulers.
47
 It was considered normal that an exchange of territory would take 
place, due to the fact that it was largely seen as a commodity. Consequently, the ruling classes 
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had little regard for the inhabitants of the exchanged territories, as the inhabitants were generally 
not perceived to be intrinsically linked with any specific territory. This was particularly the case 
with colonized lands, as Western settlers drew arbitrary borders with little care for the cultural 
and ethnic differences of the peoples within them.
48
 
This continued to be the prevalent notion until the 19th and the 20th centuries, during 
which European scholarship began to challenge the legitimacy of territorial wars and started to 
view territory in a different light. This change in attitude can largely be attributed to the societal 
transformations Europe underwent as a result of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era.
49
 
Ironically, during this time, it was the emergence of self-determination that paved the way for the 
modern interpretation for territorial integrity. The acceleration of nationalism and the ideas of 
self-determination gave rise to the notion that peoples, or nations, are inherently bound to specific 
territories, and they have a right to decide their political fate within the confines of their 
respective territory.
50
 As a result, the 19th century was also the point in history when territorial 
integrity first became a recognized legal principle. Though it was articulated as early as 1844
51
, 
the first case where territorial integrity was used in the context of an international agreement 
came in 1856, after the Crimean war, in the Paris Peace Treaty. In the Treaty, the participating 
parties agreed to “respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire”.52 
Thus, territorial integrity existed as a legal principle well before self-determination was accepted 
by law  – however, the emergence of territorial integrity during the 19th century was significantly 
aided by the popularity of self-determination as a philosophical concept. 
As with self-determination, interest surrounding the principle of territorial integrity 
increased in the aftermath of WWI. WWI was the turning point which solidified the change in the 
perception of territory in international relations – wars for conquest of territory, or rather, the use 
of force in general, were no longer seen as legitimate tools by which to conduct foreign policy.
53
 
Woodrow Wilson expressed the new attitude in the fourteenth point of his famous speech, saying 
that an association of nations must be formed, so as to ensure “[...] mutual guarantees of [...] 
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territorial integrity to great and small states alike.”54  This sentiment was echoed in the Covenant 
of the League of Nations, where, unlike self-determination, the principle of territorial integrity 
was codified in Article 10. This article obligated the participating states to respect and preserve 
the territorial integrity and political independence of all members of the League.
55
  
The drafting process of the Covenant was the first instance where the principle of 
territorial integrity and the principle of self-determination clashed in a legal context – there was 
friction amongst the participating states over the choice between self-determination and respect 
for existing borders, and territorial integrity came out the winner.
56
 To an extent, the Covenant set 
the stage for the conflict between the two principles, as it was the first time that self-
determination and territorial integrity were positioned as two opposites. During the interwar 
period, the principle of territorial integrity was further supported by various treaties and 
theories.
57
 After WWII, most powers had accepted territorial integrity as one of the basic 
principles of international law and emphasized this in the UN Charter.  
Therefore, the principle of territorial integrity is most closely bound to the perception of 
territory itself – during the early modern period, land was the key to a successful state, and, 
consequently, territory exchanges were to be expected, but that is no longer the case in the 
modern era. Interestingly, the development of the idea of national self-determination in the 19th 
century was, to a certain degree, what gave rise to the principle of territorial integrity as the link 
between a people and a territory was not recognized before that.  
 
1.2.2. Territorial integrity in international law 
United Nations 
 The following section will provide an analysis of the role of the principle of territorial 
integrity within the UN Charter. Territorial integrity is generally regarded as one of the key 
elements of the modern international system. However, the UN Charter makes a reference to the 
principle only once, in Article 2(4), which establishes the prohibition of the use of force. The 
article postulates that all UN member states agree to restrain from employing “the threat or use of 
force” in the conduct of their foreign policy against “the territorial integrity or political 
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independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.”58 The relationship between territorial integrity and the prohibition of force is 
particularly interesting. Initially, during the drafting process, the first version of the UN Charter, 
known as the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals of 1944, did not include territorial integrity in any form 
– article 2(4) merely disallowed the use or the threat of force in international relations.59 
Territorial integrity was only included in the article at the request of weaker states, such as 
Australia, Brazil, Bolivia and others, who sought to ensure as much protection as possible from 
the great powers.
60
 Thus, territorial integrity and the prohibition of force are closely intertwined. 
61
    
 In the context of self-determination of peoples, the scope of territorial integrity in the UN 
Charter has been subject for debate amongst scholars. There are two strands of thought – the 
classical interpretation, according to which the inviolability of territorial integrity is only 
applicable in state-to-state relations, and a modern interpretation, which states that the scope of 
Article 2(4) should be extended to include non-state actors.
62
 The traditional understanding rests 
on the text of Article 2(4) – it exclusively refers to the members of the UN, i.e. states, making no 
mention of non-state actors, such as groups who attempt to claim a territory within an existing 
state. According to this classical interpretation, both the prohibition of use of force and the 
principle of territorial integrity are only relevant to states in the conduct of their foreign policy. 
The scope of Article 2(4) does not include non-state actors, and, as a result, it neither disallows, 
nor recognizes secessionist movements, but simply leaves them as a purely domestic issue, 
unregulated by international law.
63
 This interpretation was favoured by the ICJ in the advisory 
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opinion on Kosovo
64
 and fell in line with preceding ICJ case law, such as the Israeli Wall 
advisory opinion
65
 and the Congo-Uganda case.
66
 
 The drastic political changes that took place during the late 20th century and the early 
21st century, however, compelled some scholars to call for a reinterpretation of the Charter and, 
consequently, of Article 2(4).
67
 As early as 1970 Thomas Franck declared Article 2(4) dead, 
writing that the UN Charter “bears little more resemblance to the modern world than does a 
Magellan map”.68 According to him, twenty five years after the emergence of the UN system, the 
world was not a better place, but, rather, just vastly different.
69
 The rules as they were written in 
the Charter are no longer properly applicable, since the circumstances for which they were 
written, no longer exist. Certainly, the same can be said of the present situation, as the 
international arena is no longer what it was in 1945, or 1970. The early 21st century saw a 
significant rise in the influence of non-state actors. The devastating 9/11 attacks illuminated the 
fundamental differences between the world of 1945 and the modern world –the Charter had been 
intended to protect against state aggression, but that was no longer enough. In the 21st century 
non-state actors developed capabilities substantial enough to pose equally as serious threats as 
states.
70
 Therefore, since the beginning of the 2000s, suggestions have emerged that the scope of 
Article 2(4) ought to be expanded beyond state-to-state relations, so that non-state actors would 
be bound to respect the same principles that states must respect.
71
  
In the context of secession, it would mean that secessionist movements would be 
precluded from claiming a territory belonging to an already existing state, as that would violate 
the territorial integrity of that state. A notable argument favouring the internal application of the 
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principle of territorial integrity as set out in Article 2(4) is the approach that the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) and the General Assembly (UNGA) adopt in practice regarding territorial 
integrity. This argument has been invoked by some states during the ICJ proceedings regarding 
the independence of Kosovo. Spain called attention to the previous practice of the UNSC in 
several armed conflicts involving non-state actors. It stated that in such conflicts, the UNSC has 
persistently held a strong “position of unequivocal support and respect for the sovereignty and 
integrity of the State”,72 regardless of the non-international nature of the conflicts. Serbia73 also 
referred to UN practice in past internal conflicts such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Congo. 
Argentina expressed this argument as well.
74
  
On several occasions the UNSC has referred to the principle of territorial integrity in its 
resolutions condemning various secessionist movements. These cases include Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Somalia, Sudan and Congo, among others.
75
 This would seemingly suggest 
that the UNSC finds non-state actors bound by the principle of territorial integrity in cases of 
secession. However, the major flaw in this argument is that the resolutions do not outright 
proclaim the principle applicable to non-state actors, but rather simply implore that all parties 
involved must respect the principle.
76
 Furthermore, the resolutions do not condemn the 
secessionist movements purely on the basis that they violated the principle of territorial integrity 
– the condemnation rises due to violations of other norms of international law and the threat to 
international peace and security that the secessionist movements pose.
77
 There has been, 
however, a tendency to extend the scope of the principle to secessionist movements that use force 
to attain their goals of independence.
78
  
 In addition to UNSC resolutions, the UNGA has also issued resolutions referring to the 
principle of territorial integrity. In the 2006 GA Resolution 60/170 on the human rights situation 
in Congo, the UNGA called on all parties involved to “cease immediately any action which 
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impedes the consolidation of the […] territorial integrity” of Congo.79 In the 1976 GA Resolution 
31/6A regarding the bantustans in South Africa, the UNGA condemned the “establishment of the 
bantustans as designed to […] destroy the territorial integrity of the country”.80 At first glance, 
the wording implies that the UNGA applies the principle of territorial integrity beyond the limits 
of inter-state relations. However, upon a closer inspection, it is evident that the UNGA treats 
territorial integrity in a similar way as the UNSC – it does not explicitly link territorial integrity 
to non-state actors, but rather uses the principle to maintain and protect other norms of 
international law. In the examples of Congo and South Africa, the aspect of international law 
which the General Assembly sought to strengthen was fundamental human rights.
81
 Therefore, 
the UN praxis cannot be said to support the expansion of the scope of Article 2(4) to include non-
state actors.  
 On the one hand, the UN Charter establishes territorial integrity as one of the main 
principles of the modern international system; on the other hand, it provides scarce guidelines on 
how to manage it. There is no framework in the Charter which would clarify the interaction 
between territorial integrity and self-determination. The traditional interpretation which prevails 
in scholarship and the ICJ jurisprudence holds that self-determination has very little to do with 
the prohibition to interfere with territorial integrity, due to the latter’s inherent interstate 
character. It has even less to do with the external aspect of self-determination, which is deemed a 
domestic matter, governed only by domestic law. The modern vision for Article 2(4) finds a 
solution in a reinterpretation of this article. It is clear that non-state actors nowadays play a much 
more significant role in international relations than they did in 1945 – the recognition of the 
internal application of the principle of territorial integrity would simply mean ensuring that the 
rules set out in the Charter remain relevant to the contemporary world. However, neither the UN 
organs, nor the ICJ, nor most scholarship recognize this modern understanding of Article 2(4), 
choosing instead to reaffirm the interstate character of the principle of territorial integrity.  
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The Friendly Relations Declaration 
 The second UN document to be analysed is the Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations of 1970, or, in short, the Friendly Relations Declaration. This 
document builds on the interpretation of the principle of territorial integrity provided in the UN 
Charter. The following section will analyse how the Friendly Relations Declaration broadens the 
principle of territorial integrity and what implications that has on the conflict between territorial 
integrity and self-determination, as well as the treatment of secession in international law. 
 Before beginning the analysis, however, an important point to discuss is the legal nature 
of UNGA resolutions. As a general rule, UNGA resolutions are of a recommendatory nature and 
do not possess binding powers.
82
 However, the ICJ has, on several occasions, held that particular 
UNGA declarations have an impact on international law and, therefore, are reflective of 
customary international law.
83
 This is the case with the Friendly Relations Declaration - in the 
2010 Kosovo Advisory Opinion, the Court stated that the Declaration as a whole “reflects 
customary international law”.84  
 The Declaration refers to the principle of territorial integrity several times. The very first 
principle deals with territorial integrity, reiterating the formulation provided in Article 2(4) of the 
Charter. However, the content of territorial integrity, as set out in Article 2(4), is expanded in the 
elaborations of the first principle – the Declaration articulates that all states should withhold from 
“organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands including 
mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State”.85 It also declares that states must 
refrain from “organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist 
acts in another State”.86 Both of these elaborations expand the content of the principle of 
territorial integrity. In the context of external self-determination, this broader interpretation 
means that instances where a secessionist movement receives support, directly or indirectly, from 
another state, also constitute a violation of the territorial integrity. Principle 6 on the sovereign 
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equality of states also makes a reference to territorial integrity, stating that sovereign equality 
inherently encompasses the inviolability of the territorial integrity of states.
87
  
 Perhaps the most interesting mention of territorial integrity can be found in Principle 5 on 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples. The elaboration of this principle contains what is 
known as the “safeguard clause”,88 a paragraph that is often highlighted for three reasons. Firstly, 
it extends the application of the principle of territorial integrity to non-state actors. Secondly, it is 
seen as potentially limiting the right to self-determination. Thirdly, it opens the door to what is 
known as remedial secession. The relevant provision reads:  
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any 
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or 
political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance 
with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and 
thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory 
without distinction as to race, creed or colour.
89
 
 The first element to be discussed is the extended scope of the application and the possible 
inclusion of non-state actors. The previous section of this paper examined the principle of 
territorial integrity established in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. The article endowed the 
principle of territorial integrity with an interstate character, which has been strictly maintained by 
the ICJ and scholarship. However, Principle 5 of the Friendly Relations Declaration according to 
some interpretations expands on the meaning of the principle, removing it from its link with the 
prohibition of force, and, perhaps, more importantly, discarding its interstate character.
90
 This 
claim stems from the fact that the clause does not clearly specify who are the actors that have the 
ability to “dismember or impair” the territorial integrity of a state, implying that non-state actors 
may have that ability, not just states alone.
91
 Moreover, the paragraph uses both self-
determination and territorial integrity in the same context, concerning the same subject – 
“peoples”. If both principles are applicable to the same subject, then this further suggests that the 
Declaration finds the internal application of the principle of territorial integrity possible. 
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The extension in scope of territorial integrity gives rise to the second element – the 
guarantee of territorial integrity of states contained in this paragraph, otherwise known as the 
“safeguard clause”. It is generally understood that the clause is intended to protect states from 
secessionist movements seeking to invoke their right to self-determination.
92
 During the ICJ 
proceedings on Kosovo independence, states such as Russia
93
 and Slovakia
94
 invoked this 
provision, firstly, as confirming that the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination 
are deeply intertwined, and, secondly, that the point of the “safeguard clause” is to protect the 
territorial integrity of a state in cases of secessionist movements.
95
 Such an interpretation would 
mean that states who conduct themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination would become “immune” to secessionist movements in the eyes of 
international law, as the “safeguard clause” would guarantee that the principle of territorial 
integrity trumps the principle of self-determination.  
 This, however, enables the third element – the recognition of remedial secession. The 
Friendly Relations Declaration is viewed as “the starting point”96 in the development of remedial 
secession theory.
97
 According to the “safeguard clause”, states who comply with the principle of 
equality and self-determination, and as a result, have a government that represents the “whole 
people belonging to the territory” are essentially protected from secessionist movements violating 
their territorial integrity. In such states, the right to self-determination is limited by the principle 
of territorial integrity. However, by the same logic, if a state does not meet the conditions laid out 
in the paragraph, the territorial integrity of that state is not protected by it. For example, in states 
where a certain group is continuously excluded from the national government, that state has 
infringed upon the right to representation of the group, and, thus, the group has the right to 
secede.
98
 This illustrates the process of remedial secession – supporters of the theory argue that a 
people have the right to external self-determination if the state from which they wish to secede 
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has subjected them to persistent injustice.
99
 However, this acknowledgement of remedial 
secession in Relations Declaration is based upon an a contrario interpretation, and the theory is 
viewed as somewhat controversial.
100
  
 As stated above, the Friendly Relations Declaration implies that territorial integrity is also 
applicable to non-state actors. But there are two points that challenge this view. Firstly, the 
paragraph does not refer to “non-state actors” or “secessionist movements”, but it links the right 
to self-determination with territorial integrity. Therefore, the duty to respect territorial integrity is 
only applicable to the subjects of self-determination – peoples”, not secessionist movements 
outside the scope of the right to self-determination.
101
 The term “peoples” does not equate with 
the term “secessionist movements”. Secondly, in its extended scope, the duty to respect the 
state’s territorial integrity would not even be binding to all “peoples”. If the state in question 
happened to promote and allow the internal self-determination of a peoples, they would be bound 
to respect the state’s territorial integrity, and therefore, precluded from enjoying the right to 
external secession.
102
 By that same token, if the state would not respect the internal self-
determination of peoples, the peoples then would not be bound by the principle of territorial 
integrity. Therefore, including non-state actors would result in a “multi-scattered” duty, one that 
is not relevant to all non-state actors, but only to “peoples”, and even then, not all “peoples”, but 
only to specific groups.
103
 
 The Friendly Relations Declaration establishes an interesting expansion to the principles 
of territorial integrity and self-determination, and, unlike the UN Charter and the human rights 
covenants, offers guidelines on how the two principles interact. It elaborates on the interstate 
character of the principle of territorial integrity, provides guarantees to states on the inviolability 
of their territorial integrity, and lays the foundation of the remedial secession theory. However, 
much of its content is subject to debate in scholarship. 
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2. Theories of secession 
The previous chapters of this paper illustrate that the contemporary discussion on 
secession, and on the conflict between the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination 
is rather lively in the field of international law, and has been that way since WWI. It is a 
discussion that has served as the overarching theme of the formation of the post-war international 
system. However, despite the relevance of the subject to the present day and the existing 
discourse in the field of law, normative theory on secession has been comparatively slow to form. 
As recently as 1991, in his essay “Towards a Theory of Secession” Allen Buchanen criticized the 
lack of normative theory on secession in political philosophy.
104
 He pointed out the curiousness 
of the fact that the most influential political thinkers of the Western world, such as Hobbes, 
Locke, Rousseau, Hegel, Marx and others, have largely ignored the phenomenon of secession.
105
 
He went on to declare this absence of theory on secession “embarrassing for liberal political 
philosophy”, particularly when taking into consideration how important a role secession played 
on the international arena in the late 1980s and the early 1990s.
106
  
Arguments have been put forward as to why it was so. The reason which partly explains 
why scholars have been hesitant to theorize on secession for so long is that secession has been 
historically linked with two unfortunate movements.
107
 Firstly, before the 20th century, the most 
notable and well-known attempt of secession was the American Civil War, where the claims to 
secession were inherently linked to the issue of slavery. Secondly, secessionist claims of ethnic 
Germans were an important element in the international tools Nazi Germany used before WWII 
to further its territorial interests in Poland and Czechoslovakia.
108
 Therefore, during the post-war 
era, there was strong support for the territorial integrity of states, and secession was seen mostly 
as a dangerous instrument.
109
 Therefore, political theorists were unwilling to elaborate on a 
concept that had no basis in international law and that was regarded essentially as a nuisance at 
best and a political crime at worst.  
But the end of the Cold War brought significant changes upon the world stage. With the 
collapse of the communist system, many young states emerged, and secession was “the word on 
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everybody’s lips”. Since then, theories on secession have become more widely discussed and the 
lack of normative theory has been rectified, as will be shown in the following sections. The 
theories developed as a result seek to answer the difficult questions the law and the courts are 
hesitant to address. These are worth examining purely for this reason – normative theory does not 
shy away from the question of the right to secession and is willing to offer valuable solutions as 
to what that right might look like and in what circumstances it should arise.  
The following chapter will analyse the two main types of normative theories of secession 
– remedial rights theories and primary rights theories. 
 
2.1. Remedial rights theories 
The first type of theories is the so-called remedial rights theories, or just cause theories. 
According to these, the right to secession is permissible if a group of peoples have experienced 
persistent injustice at the hands of the state from which they wish to secede.
110
 Buchanan, perhaps 
the most well-known promoter of the remedial rights theory, draws similarities between the 
remedial right to secession and John Locke’s theory of revolution. According to the theory of 
revolution, if the people are continuously subjected to various injustices, they have the right to 
revolt and remove the government that forces them to undergo such cruelty. In the same vein, 
remedial right to secession allows a certain portion of the people to remove themselves from 
being subjected to persistent injustice, rather than removing the government.
111
  
There are various interpretations of what constitutes injustice.
112
 Buchanan’s version of 
remedial secession, for example, rests on three conditions for injustice. Firstly, the survival of the 
particular group must be under threat by the state (for example, as it was in the case of Kurds in 
Northern Iraq), or secondly, its sovereign territory must have been unlawfully annexed by another 
state (the case of the Baltics).
113
 More recently Buchanan has also introduced a third condition, 
which allows a group the right to secede if the state has repeatedly broken agreements to ensure 
internal self-determination (self-government) for that group (as in Chechnya or Kosovo).
114
 Many 
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academics support the notion that being under threat of physical harm or extermination gives a 
group the right to secede from the state that threatens them.
115
  
Remedial rights theories are attractive because they place the concept of secession within 
the framework of fundamental human rights.
116
 However, as already mentioned in the previous 
chapter, scholarship is still largely hesitant of this concept. Many academics are particularly 
unsure about remedial secession due to its weak legal foundation – it is merely “based on an 
inverted reading” of paragraph 7 of Principle 5 of the Friendly Relations Declaration, and 
therefore, has a weak bearing in international law.
117
 Another issue regarding remedial rights 
theories is the difficulty of institutionalization.
118
 The theory rests on the notion that if the state 
commits a high degree of injustice against a minority group, the minority group, which suffers 
from that injustice, is entitled to unilaterally secede from the state. But if the state severely 
infringes upon the human rights of a specific group, it is unlikely that the state would allow the 
minority group the ability to exercise its right to secession. Similarly, if the minority group can 
exercise the right to secession, it would most likely not be able to prove that the state has 
committed any injustices against them.
119
  
Despite its weak foundation in law, remedial rights secession is the more likely candidate 
for institutionalisation out of the two theory groups. As will be shown in the case study of 
Quebec, in the Reference Re Secession of Quebec opinion, the Canadian Supreme Court spoke 
briefly of a remedial right to secession, and made mention of the “safeguard clause” in the 
Friendly Relations Declaration, thus giving rise to the suggestion that it acknowledges a remedial 
right to secession.  
2.2. Primary rights theories 
The second type of secession theories are the less restrictive primary rights theories. The 
common feature of these is the idea that injustice is not a necessary precondition for a group to 
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possess a right to secession.
120
 Primary rights theories are further separated into two groups – 
Buchanan refers to these as Ascriptivist Group theories and Associative Group theories.
121
  
Ascriptivist Group theories are also sometimes referred to as nationalist theories
122
. These 
theories state that specific groups characterized by ascriptive qualities inherently have the right to 
unilateral secession. Buchanan defines ascriptive qualities as features that are “ascribed to 
individuals independently of their choice.”123 These qualities are not political, but intrinsic, such 
as being a nation, or possessing a common language, culture or ethnicity.
124
 Most Ascriptivist 
theories deal with the concept of nations, a distinct “peoples” and their ability to maintain their 
culture.
125
 This type of theories is most often tied to the nationalist principle which holds that all 
nations or peoples are entitled to political independence. This group of theories is attractive to 
those who view it as a means through which nations can maintain their specific societal culture 
and identity.
126
 However, the ascriptivist group theories are treated with wariness in scholarship, 
because the idea that every nation is entitled to the right of secession, can be very dangerous in 
praxis. Within multinational states, this would mean setting ethnic or cultural minorities against 
the majority and giving rise to violence between these different groups.
127
 In addition, it could 
also lead to ceaseless fragmentation of the international stage in the long-term.
128
 Furthermore, 
another issue with ascriptivist group theories is that it demands a definition of what exactly 
constitutes a nation.
129
 Therefore, it is unlikely that this ascriptive group theories would ever be 
institutionalised in international law. In comparison, remedial rights theories are more attractive 
to legal scholars because they can be placed in an already existing framework of international 
law. Ascriptive group theories, however, are in a sense, far more radical.  
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The second type of primary right theories is what Buchanan calls the Associative Group 
or Plebiscitary theories. These differ from Ascriptive Group theories in that they do not require 
for the group who wishes to secede to have any common characteristics apart from the desire to 
secede. The group need not share ethnic, cultural or linguistic roots.
130
 Associative group theories 
postulate that any group can secede if it can muster a majority in a referendum and is capable of 
maintaining the institutions necessary to form a state.
131
 Theories of this type are formed upon the 
basis of majoritarian democracy.
132
 However, theorists usually place specific criteria upon the 
seceding group. Philpott, for example, views the right to secession as contingent, and states 
firstly, that the seceding group must be at least as democratic and liberal as the state from which 
they wish to secede, secondly, that the majority of the group must favour secession, thirdly, that 
there is sufficient protection offered to minorities within the group and lastly, that the group 
meets the standards of distributive justice.
133
  
The attractive aspects of the associative group lie in its liberal approach and the fact that it 
does not elicit the difficult question of what constitutes a peoples, as ascriptive group theories do. 
However, when brought to the question of institutionalization, associative group theories falter 
when compared to remedial rights theories. The right to secession as set out by associative group 
theories is arguably a very extreme form of secession, which has little to no basis within the 
existing international law framework.  
Generally, the issue with all primary rights theories seems to be institutionalisation in 
international law. As Philpott points out, contrariety with international law does not necessarily in 
itself mean that the theories are invalid: “To reject such theories requires a demonstration that 
they are wrong, not merely an assertion that they contradict well entrenched principles.”134 To 
instil in international law the ideas expressed by primary rights theories would, to some extent, 
call for an overhaul of the international law system. It would demand that existing principles and 
precedents are re-examined in a different light, taking into account the contemporary 
circumstances on the world stage.
135
 However, Philpott states that it is unlikely that such 
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acceptance of any secession theories, remedial or primary, within the international law system 
would happen any time soon.
136
 
 
3. Case studies 
3.1. Quebec 
3.1.1. Overview 
 Quebec, one of Canada’s ten provinces, is inhabited mainly by French-speaking 
Canadians. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, Quebec began to insist on a higher 
degree of independence from Canada.
137
 The first pro-independence efforts started in the 1960s, a 
period during which Quebec underwent many social, political and economic changes. As a result, 
the province began to move away from the conservative policies which had hitherto dominated 
Canadian and Quebecois politics. This change was signified by the victory of the Quebec Liberal 
Party (QLP) in the 1960 elections, which positioned itself as an “expression of French 
Canada”.138  
 During the 1960s and the 1970s, Quebec nationalism became more deeply entrenched in 
the francophone society and Quebec began to gradually push for more autonomy, asking for more 
powers from the federal government.
139
 Throughout the 1970s, the interests of the Canadian 
government and Quebec nationalists increasingly clashed with one another.
140
 In hindsight, the 
die was cast with the election of 1976, won by the Parti Québécois (PQ), which ran with 
independence as its main platform. The first independence referendum was held in 1980, but the 
results brought a defeat to the PQ as nearly 60% of the electorate rejected their proposal.
141
 
 This was a significant blow to the nationalist movement in Quebec. The province became 
somewhat subdued regarding its independence aspirations until the 1990s. 1990 saw the 
improvement of the socio-economic circumstances of many Quebeckers, as well as the 
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establishment of the Bloc Québécois, a sovereigntist party that operated at the federal level.142 
These factors gave new impetus to the nationalist movement, prompting the federal government 
to create the Commission on the political and constitutional future of Quebec, in order to find 
solutions how to deal with the nationalist movement. The Commission found that another 
referendum on the independence of Quebec was necessary.
143
 Thus, the second referendum was 
held in 1995. It brought another disappointment to the nationalists, as the population voted again 
to remain a part of Canada. However, this time the majority was slight – 49.4% of the population 
voted to secede from Canada.
144
 Due to the very narrow result, the Canadian parliament made a 
request to the Canadian Supreme Court to provide an opinion on the legality of Quebecois 
independence under international and domestic law.
145
  
 
3.1.2. Analysis of Reference Re Secession of Quebec 
 The following chapter will delve into deeper analysis of Reference Re Secession of 
Quebec, the opinion provided by the Supreme Court of Canada. Though, naturally, the opinion 
had no binding power on the international arena, it is worth examining for several reasons. On the 
one hand, this case, much like the entire process of the Quebec secession story, represents to an 
extent the liberal approach to secession – consensual and constitutional, with minimal threat of 
violence. However, it also sheds light on the weaknesses of the prevalent notion in international 
law that secession ought to be dealt with domestically.     
 The questions brought before the Court were:  
1. Under the Constitution of Canada, can the National Assembly, legislature or government of 
Quebec effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? 
2. Does international law give the National Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec the right 
to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? In this regard, is there a right to self-
determination under international law that would give the National Assembly, legislature or 
government of Quebec the right to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? 
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3. In the event of a conflict between domestic and international law on the right of the National 
Assembly, legislature or government of Quebec to effect the secession of Quebec from Canada 
unilaterally, which would take precedence in Canada?
146
 
 Before answering the questions, the Court examined as a preliminary matter, its 
jurisdiction in the case. The Court eventually found that the Canadian Constitution does not allow 
Quebec to secede from Canada unilaterally.
147
 It also declared that nothing in international law 
gives Quebec a right to unilateral secession. Regarding Question 3, the Court stated that 
considering its answers to the first two questions, it perceives no conflict between international 
and domestic law, and therefore, it is not necessary to answer the third question.  The analysis 
will firstly elaborate on the Court’s evaluation of its jurisdiction, to examine how a domestic 
court can respond in matters regarding secession. Secondly, since this paper exclusively deals 
with the treatment of secession in international law, not secession and constitutionalism, this 
analysis will focus on Question 2 and the Court’s assessment of secession under international 
law. Finally, it will also touch upon the question whether domestic courts should have the ability 
to decide on the right of secession at all.   
 Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction, the amicus curiae brought forward a claim that the 
Court cannot answer Question 2, as it pertains to “pure” international law and is outside the 
jurisdiction of the Court.
148
 It was claimed firstly, that the Court would be “purporting to “act as” 
an international tribunal” by giving its opinion on the matter149, and secondly, that as a domestic 
court, it had no authority to provide its opinion, as the subject matter dealt with international law, 
rather than domestic law
150
. Thirdly, the amicus curiae stated that the questions presented to the 
Court are “speculative”, “of a political nature” and not “ripe for judicial decision”.151 
 The Court found that nothing precludes it from dealing with the type of questions 
presented in this case.
152
 Regarding the issues brought forward about Question 2, the Court stated 
that it would not be attempting to act as an international tribunal, nor would it demand that any 
other state be bound by its opinion.
153
 As for the second claim made about Question 2, that the 
Court, being a domestic court, had no competence to opine on matters that deal with international 
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law – the Court stated rather bluntly that “this concern is groundless.”154 The Court stated that 
Question 2 was not an abstract question purely related to international law, but one that aims to 
“determine the legal rights and obligations of the National Assembly, legislature or government 
of Quebec.”155 Regarding the third claim, the Court stated that the questions are of a 
“fundamental public importance” and are not so imprecise to invalidate the possibility of a proper 
legal answer. Indeed, the Court declared that it is duty bound to provide an opinion on this 
matter.
156
  
In its evaluation of secession in international law, the Court found that international law 
does not permit a right to unilateral secession. It stated that supporters of such a right can put 
forward but two arguments – first, the lack of an explicit prohibition on secession and second, the 
“implied duty” of states to respect secession as an expression of the right to self-determination.157 
Regarding the first argument, the Court pointed out the emphasis that the international law 
system places on territorial integrity and the notion that secession is a domestic matter. Therefore, 
in cases where the domestic Constitution allows no unilateral right to secession, as in this case, 
the Court stated that international law would not challenge such an outcome.
158
  
With respect to the second point, the Court referred to international law instruments –  the 
UN Charter, the Human Rights Covenants, the Friendly Relations Declaration, the 1993 Vienna 
Declaration on Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act.
159
 It found that these sources of 
international law are very specific in their expressions of the right to self-determination, in that 
they seek to limit the right enough so as to avoid threats to the territorial integrity of states. In 
particular, the Court referred to the so-called “safeguard clause” in the Friendly Relations 
Declaration and the Vienna Declaration on Human Rights, as well as provisions in the Helsinki 
Final Act and the Human Rights Covenants that express similar ideas.
160
 These sources allow 
only the right to internal self-determination, exercised within an already existing state.
161
 The 
right to external secession, however, only exists in very rare cases. The Court outlines three 
contexts which could potentially give rise to a right to external self-determination. Firstly, the 
colonial context – colonized peoples have an undisputed right to external self-determination. 
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Secondly, in cases where a people are under foreign subjugation in a non-colonial context. 
Thirdly, when a people are continuously denied the right to internal self-determination.
162
 The 
Court stated that none of the three contexts are applicable to the population of Quebec and 
therefore, it does not possess a right to secession under international law.
163
 The three contexts 
outlined by the Court essentially speak of a remedial right to secession, which suggests that the 
Court views remedial secession as a legitimate solution in cases of secession. In this case, where 
the group cannot claim a remedial right, the secession process, therefore, falls under the domestic 
law and institutions. 
The case is a valuable example, one that indicates that a liberal approach to secession, one 
that respects both the rights of the seceding group and the state and is able to deal with secession 
domestically and peacefully, is indeed possible. However, it is unlikely to be replicated in 
countries with more volatile secessionist movements. It is important to note several reasons why 
the domestic jurisprudence path taken by Canada should not and cannot be the general approach 
to secession claims. 
The Court found that it was well within its purview to deal with matters of international 
law, but there are several elements that complicate such a position and suggest an earlier, more 
active involvement of the international community would generally be preferable in cases of 
secession. Firstly, states, and by extension, any domestic institution of the state, will always be 
interested in a specific outcome – the retention of the state’s togetherness.164 It seems strange that 
a domestic court would be treated as an entirely neutral actor in the process of secession. 
Furthermore, perhaps not in Canada, but certainly in other countries, domestic courts would 
simply not hold enough credibility in the eyes of the secessionists, and therefore, could trigger 
violence or deepen already existing violence between the state and secessionists, who refuse to 
recognize the judgement. Secondly, as the Court stated, the emergence of a new state is very 
much dependent upon international recognition.
165
 The recognition process, however, is usually 
fraught with political interests and the hesitance to become involved.
166
 According to Frankel, 
this “hands off” approach is the greatest flaw in the international community’s system for dealing 
with secession. It is this inattention of the international community that leads to “continued 
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instability, violence and oppression”167 and that active involvement of the international 
community would be the first step in the creation of a new system.
168
 Domestic jurisdiction is a 
controversial subject, as most secessionist movements produce consequences that are of an 
international nature.
169
  
The Quebec case is a good model for dealing with secessionist movements in situations 
where a remedial right to secession is absent. Where there are no human rights violations, the 
secession process can be done with the consent of all parties involved, in accordance with 
domestic law. However, often that is not the case – peaceful secessionist movements that 
experience no injustice from the state are relatively rare. The next case study will deal with 
Kosovo, a situation that could not be further from that of Quebec – a secessionist movement that 
inflicted and suffered terrible injustices which eventually demanded the attention of the 
international community. 
 
3.2. Kosovo 
3.2.1. Overview 
The roots of the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia stretch back into medieval times, 
and the relations between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs have been strained for several centuries. 
From 1945 Kosovo had been a part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) as an 
autonomous province of the Socialist Republic of Serbia.
170
 During the early 1990s, with the 
dissolution of the SFRY, Kosovo initially became a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY), formed in 1992, until 2003 when the remaining FRY republics, Serbia and Montenegro, 
joined together in a federation. Eventually Montenegro left the union and Kosovo became a part 
of the independent state of Serbia.
171
  
Kosovo enjoyed the status of an autonomous province until the second half of the 1980s. 
This status granted the region a significant degree of internal self-determination – Kosovar 
Albanians had access to education and media in their language, were able to freely celebrate 
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national holidays and generally preserve their culture and character.
172
 However, throughout the 
1980s, as the relations between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs living in the region worsened, 
Serbia under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic took drastic measures in order to strip Kosovo 
of its autonomy. As a result of this, Kosovar Albanians did not have access to many political and 
civil rights.
173
 In response, Kosovar Albanians organized a resistance movement, initially 
peaceful, but by 1995-96 it had merged into the Kosovo Liberation Army, an organization that 
conducted guerrilla attacks on Serbian security forces.
174
 These attacks prompted a devastating 
retaliation by the Serbian leadership, causing the international community to become involved.
175
  
For most of the 20th century, the Kosovo issue had been viewed as a purely domestic matter, 
relevant only to SFRY. With the collapse of the SFRY, the international community began to pay 
more attention to Kosovo, as there were concerns that it could have a domino effect on other 
post-Soviet states.
176
 Furthermore, it became clear that the conflicts in Yugoslavia could not be 
properly resolved without addressing the Kosovo problem.
177
 Initially, the international 
community believed it would be possible to find a peaceful solution in the situation, but when 
peace talks fell through, it resorted to force – NATO states began an aerial bombardment of 
Serbia in 1999 which lasted for three months. This eventually forced the demise of Milosevic’s 
regime and resulted in the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo.
178
    
Following the downfall of Milosevic, Serbia began to forge stronger ties with Western 
countries. Its attitude toward Kosovo softened slightly, but it did not abandon the position that 
Kosovo ought to be an autonomous region within Serbia. Kosovo, however, with the support of 
Western states, declared its independence in 2008, though it is still not recognized by many 
states.
179
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3.2.2. Analysis of the ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo 
 
Kosovo, in comparison with Quebec, represents entirely different circumstances. In this 
case the conflict between the state and the secessionists was so deep that a domestic court would 
not have been able to claim credibility in the matter. The international community had no choice 
but to become involved. However, the outcome of this involvement proved to be less elucidating 
than many had hoped. The ICJ only reiterated the hesitancy of international law to provide a 
clarification on external self-determination or the conflict between self-determination and 
territorial integrity. 
The ICJ delivered its opinion on the case in 2010, having been requested to opine on the 
matter by the UNGA in 2008.
180
 The question set out before the court was: “Is the unilateral 
declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in 
accordance with international law?”181 In an examination of the Court’s jurisdiction and 
discretion, it found that it had both and was able to provide an opinion in the respective matter.
182
 
Regarding the interpretation of the question, the Court found that the question presented to it was 
sufficiently narrow and specific. According to the Court, the question did not deal with the legal 
consequences of the act of declaring independence, nor did it ask if Kosovo has gained statehood 
as a result of the declaration. Furthermore, it did not inquire about the validity of the recognition 
of Kosovo and the legal effects emanating from that recognition.
183
 It did comment on the 
identity of the authors of the declaration, stating that this was an issue that could affect the 
outcome of the Court’s opinion, and therefore, the Court must be able to examine the identity of 
the authors itself.
184
 Furthermore, it drew a clear distinction between the acts of “declaring” 
independence and “effecting” secession, referencing the Reference Re Secession of Quebec case. 
In the Quebec case the issue had been over “effecting” secession, but in this case, the issue at 
hand was whether the act of declaring independence was in accordance with international law.
185
 
Essentially, the Court remained with a very narrow interpretation of the question put forward to it 
by the UNGA – its interpretation was constricted to determining the legality of declaring 
independence, rather than examining whether international law provided Kosovo with a right to 
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unilaterally secede. This interpretation has been heavily criticized. Muharremi called the 
differentiating between “effecting” and “declaring” independence “artificial and not necessarily 
convincing”.186 He went on to say that it is not compatible with how states are formed in practice, 
that declaring statehood and exercising statehood cannot be treated as two separate elements.
187
  
The Court did briefly touch upon the conflict between self-determination and territorial 
integrity, as well as the right to secede. It pointed out that the development of self-determination 
has created a right to independence to colonized peoples and peoples under alien subjugation. 
Further, it stated that nothing in international law prohibits declaring independence in such 
contexts, and at times, even outside of these contexts.
188
 Regarding territorial integrity, the Court 
referred to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, the Friendly Relations Declaration and the Final 
Helsinki Act to reiterate the importance or territorial integrity, and to clarify that the principle 
only pertains to state relations.
189
 In contrast to the Quebec case, it made no mention of the 
“safeguard clause” in the Friendly Relations Declaration. The Court made note of the 
submissions made by several states regarding UNSC resolutions condemning secessionist 
movements for violating the territorial integrity of a state. However, it stated that the UNSC had 
condemned the “illegality attached to the declarations of independence”, rather than the unilateral 
nature of the declaration.
190
 The Court also mentioned remedial secession, but made a statement 
that it “is not necessary to resolve these questions in the present case”, thus leaving the issue of 
remedial secession without a clarification.
191
  
The Court eventually found that the Kosovo declaration of independence and the adoption 
of that declaration was not in violation of international law.
192
 This ruling was problematic, 
however, largely due to the Court’s interpretation of the question. The question presented to the 
Court asked if the declaration was “in accordance with” international law, but the Court came to 
the conclusion that it “did not violate” international law – Judge Simma in his Separate Opinion 
expressed the view that such a conclusion was contrary to the wording of the initial question and 
avoided a the crucial question of whether international law can “permit or even foresee an 
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entitlement to declare independence” under specific conditions.193 He attributed this 
interpretation and the Court’s general approach regarding the case to its implicit reliance on the 
Lotus principle, which he termed an “old, tired view of international law” originating in a 1927 
judgement from the Permanent Court of International Justice.
194
 According to the Lotus principle, 
a state has no need to show a permissive rule regarding a specific act, if there exists no 
prohibition of it.
195
 However, it is worth noting that this claim has been questioned, as the Court’s 
reliance upon the Lotus principle is firstly, implicit, as it never referred to it in its opinion, and 
secondly, inverted, due to the principle being relevant to states and the idea of state freedom. 
Here it is used in the opposite sense – against the state.196 Judge Simma stated that had the Court 
moved away from the Lotus principle, it would have had the chance to opine on several important 
aspects of the case that were not touched upon.
197
 The Court could have addressed the right to 
self-determination and remedial secession, as many of the participating states referred to it in 
their arguments, but due to the restrictive interpretation of the question, the Court chose not to 
examine the issue. This has given way to much confusion surrounding the issue of whether 
peoples have the right to secede.
198
  
Simma found the Court’s narrow interpretation of the question a failure to acknowledge 
and properly deal with “the great shades of nuance” in international law. Essentially, in his view, 
the Court had not managed to comprehensively answer the question presented to it. This opinion 
was largely echoed in scholarship, where the ICJ Advisory Opinion drew heavy criticism for the 
narrow interpretation of the question and the resulting lack of clarity.
199
  
The two cases, Quebec and Kosovo, show two different circumstances and approaches to 
secession in international law. The Quebec case illuminated how secession could proceed if 
approached in a liberal manner – certainly not without its upheavals, but largely peaceful and in 
accordance with state law. However, in the context of secessionist movements, Quebec was in an 
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extremely privileged situation. The state from which it wished to secede relied on the idea that 
secession is a domestic matter and was willing to negotiate instead of using force to suppress any 
independence aspirations. The conflict between Kosovo and Serbia illustrates that this is not 
always the case. In this situation, the relations between the secessionist movement and the state 
were deeply bitter and both sides had suffered significant violence, thus, making the approach 
taken by Canada impossible.  
The international community had to intervene, but, arguably, this intervention came too 
late. It was an example of what Frankel called the “hands-off” approach – the international 
community became involved only when it became clear that the conflicts in the Balkans cannot 
be brought to an end without addressing Kosovo, and when fears emerged over a possible 
domino-effect ripping through Eastern Europe. To paraphrase Frankel, mindless violence should 
not be the primary way how secessionist movements gain international attention.
200
 He found that 
early involvement of the international community in conflicts relating to secession would be 
beneficial in reducing the loss of life and the suffering that these conflicts bring.
201
  
 The ICJ Advisory Opinion illuminated that there is a tendency in international law to 
avoid the question of secession, despite its burning relevance and importance. There are 
continued efforts to frame secession as a purely domestic issue. This pervasive notion of 
international law is sufficient in cases such as Quebec, where a region wishes to secede from a 
state that has no intention of exerting oppressive policies upon that region. However, it simply 
does not hold up when faced with situations such as in Kosovo, where the state is unable to deal 
with secession domestically and causes deep human suffering as a result. In these cases, early and 
active involvement of the international community could help in minimizing the violence arising 
from the conflict.  
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Conclusion 
This paper has sought to analyse the approach taken by international law to secession 
within the context of the conflict between the principles of self-determination and territorial 
integrity. It found that the international community persistently attempts to present secession as a 
domestic matter that does not pertain to international law.  
The first part of the paper looked at the principles of self-determination and territorial 
integrity separately. Self-determination as set out in the UN Charter is vague, however, one can 
deduce it was intended to be a principle that ensures the self-government, thus, internal self-
determination, to non-self-governing peoples, instead of a right that allows a people living in an 
existing state to secede from that state. Further, the International Human Rights Covenants can 
indeed be regarded as an important source, as these are where a universal right to self-
determination appeared for the very first time. This right, however, is characterized by the same 
lack of clarity regarding its scope or applicability as the principle of self-determination in the UN 
Charter. Neither of the documents envision or even make mention of the possibility of a right to 
external self-determination. 
The principle of territorial integrity in the UN Charter is intrinsically linked with the 
prohibition of force. Article 2(4) of the Charter has been the subject of much debate due to its 
interstate character. The UN Charter essentially does not acknowledge the principle of territorial 
integrity as applicable to non-state actors, an element which has been upkept by the ICJ in several 
of its judgements. This shows that international law neither recognizes, nor prohibits the ability 
of non-state actors, such as secessionist movements, to occupy and claim the territory of a state. 
Rather, it simply chooses to not address the issue and frame it as a domestic matter, subject to 
domestic law. However, the Friendly Relations Declaration provides a broader interpretation of 
the principle of territorial integrity and how it interacts with the principle of self-determination. 
Furthermore, it makes an extremely important, albeit controversial, contribution with the so-
called “safeguard clause”, which has been interpreted as opening the door to remedial secession. 
The second part of the paper dealt with normative theories of secession, in order to reflect 
more recent interpretations of the concept of secession. The author of this paper outlined two 
groups of theories – the remedial rights and the primary rights theories. The former, characterized 
by the view that a right to secession ought to exist for groups who have suffered persistent 
injustice at the hands of the state, seems to be the more acceptable of the two, as it can be placed 
within an existing framework of international law. The latter, which does not perceive injustice as 
a necessary precursor for the right to secession, appears unlikely to ever be implemented as 
policy or in law. Though it is not necessarily morally wrong, it is simply too radical for the 
current situation.  
The third part examined two secessionist movements and two different approaches taken 
by courts. The first, the case of Quebec, illustrated how the secession process takes place in a 
liberal democracy where the state is willing to negotiate and accommodate the peoples seeking 
self-determination. It showed that secession can be dealt with domestically, but by that same 
token, it illuminated why that should not be perceived as the general approach to secession – it 
simply would not work in states where the relationship between the secessionist movement and 
the state is volatile and violent. Kosovo proved to be an example of this. 
The analysis of Kosovo brought a twofold conclusion. Firstly, it was an example of a 
situation where the state is unable to deal with secession on the domestic level and, thus, inflicts 
harm on the peoples who wish to secede. It showed that the “hands-off” approach of the 
international community brings human suffering to the parties involved in the conflict; had the 
international community involved itself at an earlier stage, it is possible that such violence could 
have been avoided. Secondly, the ICJ Advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence 
shows the reluctance of the ICJ to analyse secession. In this opinion, the ICJ drew an arbitrary 
line between “declaring” and “effecting” independence to avoid having to opine on the 
consequences of declaring independence. The opinion was met with disappointment by many 
who had seen the Kosovo case as a possibility for the ICJ to clarify the opaque issue of secession. 
Though it is clearly a controversial issue capable of evoking a fiery reaction in the international 
community, the failure of international law to address it will not mean that it ceases to have 
consequences on the international stage – the birth of a new state can hardly be categorized as 
solely an internal issue of an already existing state.  
Throughout the process of writing this paper, the author has come to a conclusion which 
can be expressed in the simplest terms – the UN Charter, the very heart and soul of the current 
system of international law, is an unequivocally beautiful document. It sheds light on some of the 
best aspects of humankind - the wish to provide a better world for those who come after us, the 
desire to be governed by a just system that prizes peace above conquest and the will to come 
together in order to create that system. The UN Charter, and the international law system that 
arose from it, were guided by the best intentions. However, as it so often happens in praxis, those 
intentions take a life on their own and are substantially transformed over time. The intentions 
with which the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity were enshrined in 
international law no longer correspond to the contemporary world. Therefore, the author of this 
paper holds the view that the approach to secession in international law should be revalued – it is 
based on vague and, to an extent, outdated definitions of both the principle of self-determination 
and territorial integrity. 
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